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Zero-Maintenance of Electronic Systems:
Perspectives, Challenges, and Opportunities
Richard McWilliam, Member, IEEE, Samir Khan, Member, IEEE, Michael Farnsworth, Colin Bell
Abstract—Self-engineering systems that are capable of repair-
ing themselves in-situ without the need for human decision (or
intervention) could be used to achieve zero-maintenance. This
philosophy is synonymous to the way in which the human body
heals and repairs itself up to a point. This article synthesises
issues related to an emerging area of self-healing technologies that
links software and hardware mitigations strategies. Efforts are
concentrated on built-in detection, masking and active mitigation
that comprises self-recovery or self-repair capability, and has
a focus on system resilience and recovering from fault events.
Design techniques are critically reviewed to clarify the role of
fault coverage, resource allocation and fault awareness, set in the
context of existing and emerging printable/nanoscale manufac-
turing processes. The analysis presents new opportunities to form
a view on the research required for a successful integration of
zero-maintenance. Finally, the potential cost benefits and future
trends are enumerated.
Index Terms—Fault-tolerance, self-repair, zero-maintenance,
built-in fault detection, self-healing systems
I. INTRODUCTION
The rising maintenance costs facing today’s high value
manufacturing industry is fuelling a new appetite for design
strategies that reduce maintenance, repair and overhaul costs
of complex high value systems [1]. The availability and
dependability of electronic components and sub-components
within complex, high-value systems is a critical driver for
reducing the net cost per hour of operation. Fault events and
associated system error states incur punitive costs due to; fault
location and diagnosis; invasive inspection and test; provision
for frequent maintenance intervals even if fault events have not
occurred. Electronic systems and sub-systems have therefore
become a pivotal element in fault-sensitive, service-driven
sectors.
This article surveys several journal articles, conference
papers, books and literature reviews on hardware approaches
that are anticipated to pave the way towards zero-maintenance
capabilities. Such capabilities are difficult (or even impossible)
to implement exclusively within the software, mechanical
or materials domains: instead the majority of strategies are
partially (or fully) coupled with electronic systems and sub-
systems since this permits a wide range of fault mitigation
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approaches. Hence cross-domain strategies feature heavily in
the methods considered. The aim of this work is therefore
to develop a core understanding of zero-maintenance within
electronic systems and related design strategies for its imple-
mentation. This is achieved through a number of objectives
outlined below:
• Analyse current trends in the evolution of self-recovery
and self-repair towards achieving zero-maintenance;
• Present a quantitative (and where possible qualitative)
comprehension of the design trade-off factors and met-
rics;
• Develop a cohesive understanding of zero-maintenance
as a design approach and technology in its own right;
• Develop an appreciation of the core merits of zero-
maintenance through a sector-wise view of the technol-
ogy.
The title of this article has been chosen carefully, because the
use of the word perspectives implies a personal analysis and
presentation on behalf of the authors. The authors’ expertise
range in the areas of diagnostic design, signal processing,
maintenance, self-healing and machine learning; with signifi-
cant focus on practical implementation rather than theoretical.
Nevertheless, the article’s contents will be of general interest
to electrical scientists and engineers, because some of the
more practical issues of implementing self-recovery and self-
repair capabilities are often not appreciated, let alone the costs
attached to them. The focus is therefore towards detailing
the philosophy of having zero-maintenance. The principal
concepts of self-detection, fault masking/mitigation behaviour
monitoring are analysed and categorised according to their
design level implementations. Self-recovery in the presence of
faults is an important step towards realising complex systems
capable of maintaining their designed for function throughout
their intended life-cycle. The other characteristic is that their
common design metrics must be analysed in terms of fault
coverage, resource allocation/cost and fault awareness set in
the context of existing and emerging electronic manufacturing
processes. To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is
the first study which provides a detailed account on zero-
maintenance systems and related system approaches. These
accounts have been broken down into research questions, that
are suggested together with their motivations in Table I. The
questions are aimed to make some semantic distinctions which
are important towards application. These can be divided in
terms of approach (active or passive), methodologies, tech-
niques, applications, implementation requirements and capa-
bilities, cost implications and their impact.
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TABLE I
RESEARCH QUESTIONS
Research question Table(s) Motivation
What are the technological requirements for zero-maintenance? VI, XI, XII
Identify the types of implementation tools that can be used to
accomplish a task
What approaches can be considered to achieve these capabilities? XIV, XV Identify the types of active and passive approaches
What kind of design methodologies can be used for
zero-maintenance?
XIII, XVI Identify how to systematically solve the problem
What techniques can be used to provide built-in fault detection? III Identify the type of techniques or tests that can be used
What metrics can be used to estimate the cost implications? VIII Identify the most important key performance metrics
What are the challenges for a zero-maintenance philosophy on
mission-critical and resilience systems?
XVI Identify opportunities for self management systems
What kind of applications can benefit from its successful
realisation?
XVII Categorise the applications where it can be used
A. Contributions
The article focuses on an emerging and important topic
across many complex engineering industries. It provides a
broad overview of self healing and self repair techniques,
which span multiple application domains. For each technique,
the authors provide its basic form and then consider how it
can be useful to achieve zero-maintenance. Literature devel-
opments are discussed accordingly. This template provides
an easier and succinct understanding of these techniques,
taking note of their applicability and limitations. Whilst most
of the work covered focuses on the electronics industry,
there is an increase interest from electro-mechanical domain.
The authors have noted that zero-maintenance systems need
to attain the characteristics of self-diagnosis, self-repair and
self-immobilisation to some degree, to prevent more serious
damage and catastrophic breakdowns. As research within this
area is of practical importance, some older references have
been included, e.g., early discussions about online self-test
and repair, which never really took hold after electronics
became repairable during manufacture and relatively robust
in-service. This is not necessarily true of emerging non-
CMOS technologies and so the online repair theme is popular
once more. To accomplish the study aims and objectives, this
research undertook a filtering process where the key main
themes and subtopics (formalisms, design and strategies for
zero-maintenance of electronic systems) were decided upon,
and selected journals and conferences formed the bulk of
material for review and analysis. These range from electronics,
maintenance and repair, manufacture and more, all of which
are directly related to self-recovery, self-repair and its mainte-
nance application. To summarise the key contributions at the
outset, the article provides:
• An organised and critical view of current and emerging
trends towards achieving zero-maintenance;
• A state-of-the-art on common design techniques in terms
of fault coverage, resource allocation/cost and fault
awareness set in the context of existing and emerging
electronic manufacturing processes;
• A discussion of the key performance metrics and their
relevance within different application domains. This in-
cludes past methods that have seen renewed interest such
as fine-grained device/interconnect redundancy;
• An overview of the potential impact upon mission-
critical, high resilience systems whose useful lifespan
depends on efficient, self-management of spare resources.
There seems to be an over-emphasis on being able to
deploy high-level models rapidly, without the need of
an underlying technical expertise about the processing
framework;
• Consideration is given to the relative effort needed for the
successful integration of a zero-maintenance philosophy
weighed against cost factors.
Also, the authors have written this article in a way, that
can allow readers with a non-electronic background to gain an
understanding of the zero-maintenance philosophy. The article
first follows the trends towards zero-maintenance and dis-
cusses the challenges for its successful realisation in Section II.
In Section III, a brief perspective on the quantification of zero-
maintenance parameters is formed. Expanding upon this we
delve into more detail on how this approach can be introduced
into electronic systems, providing state of the art examples in
Section IV. It also outlines recent approaches for quantifying
the success and trade offs of these techniques using current
metrics. The discussion then switches to focus upon design
with an overview of the main active and passive methods for
mitigating faults in electronic systems in Section V, before a
look at how a number of design strategies can be undertaken to
incorporate these techniques across a number of applications
in Sections VI. Finally the paper looks forward, drawing
conclusions about this emerging field, with an outlook on the
opportunities and challenges that await.
II. TOWARDS ZERO-MAINTENANCE
Can a system’s maintenance effort be reduced to zero?
Perhaps a more realistic question is: can a system operate as
originally intended, all the time?
If a system (or service or component) operates without
failing, and delivers the exact business function without any
manual intervention, then there is some semblance of mov-
ing towards zero-maintenance. Even though this may only
be a theoretical possibility, it provides a perspective to ex-
plore questions for bridging a knowledge gap. An ideal self-
engineering system should be capable of repairing itself in-situ
without the need for human decision (or intervention). This
will have a significant impact on reducing the overall cost of
the maintenance process [2]. However, the application of this
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philosophy within engineering is a challenge and the authors
aim to draw attention to the need for maintenance systems to
have self-diagnosis and self-repair capabilities, built-in logic
for self-reconfiguration and a cost weighted solution.
The concept embodies the idea of enabling applications and
systems to achieve and sustain near-zero spend, and transform
the traditional maintenance practices from ‘Fail-and-Fix’ to
‘Predict-and-Prevent’ and ultimately to a ‘Fail-Proof’ state. A
classification of literature is presented in Table II with a direct
link between the topic of interest and the concepts discussed
and analysed within. These articles highlight that concepts
such as self-healing and self-repair are predominantly designed
at the component and material science level. Within all these
applications, there are generic concepts of zero-maintenance.
However, for safety-critical applications, such as aerospace or
nuclear that operate in inaccessible environments (e.g. space,
offshore), there is a need to have a system level of self-
diagnosis and self-repair, if not self-immobilisation, to prevent
more serious damage and catastrophic breakdowns.
In the broadest sense, Reliability, Availability and Service-
ability (RAS) performance metrics become highly dependent
upon self-repair capability. Further downstream impact can
be seen within integrated health monitoring, online self-test
within which interrupt-free service is a critical profit margin
driver [17], [18], [19]. As a result of this, growing interest
has emerged for new design strategies with zero-maintenance
properties. This article will focus on electronic components
and sub-systems that are equipped with new fault detection
and classification capabilities [20], [21]. Existing capabilities
that can relate to these concepts are briefly introduced in
Table III. Maintenance can be related to this emerging area
of self-healing technologies as it links software and hardware
mitigations strategies across multiple domains where many
failure classes exist [22], [23]. Examples relating to elec-
tronic systems include mechatronics [24], control [25] and
materials. In some cases an overlap exists between hardware
and software domains occurs for example, in fault-tolerant
GPU algorithms [26], VHDL methods for redundant layout
in FPGAs [27] and FPGA bitstream manipulation [8] and
therefore zero-maintenance is driven by a subset of failure
classes. In addition to this, mitigation relies upon an aware-
ness of the underlying hardware, especially multiple multi-
processor, custom configurable architectures and reliability-
driven compilation [7]. This survey therefore focuses on key
emerging trends for hardware-driven mitigation methods that
relate to Table III.
A. Technology platforms
The philosophy of zero-maintenance is relatable to several
existing and emerging electronic technologies. State-of-the-
art hardware fault mitigation techniques handle permanent
faults using active detect-respond mitigation, whilst sometimes
operating along side passive masking. FPGAs are frequently
used for studies in this area [6] where online reconfigu-
ration remains a highly challenging task [12], [28], [29].
More sophisticated reconfigurable platforms are emerging that
support development of dynamic self-test and repair (STAR).
Manufacturing yield enhancement has been a strong driver for
significant investment for silicon electronics and the resulting
yield-driven strategies continue to extract fully functional oper-
ation out of essentially error-prone fabrication processes [30].
These strategies are undergoing a transformation to include
built in repair mechanisms that operate beyond the point of
manufacture. Emerging non-silicone technologies of relevance
to zero-maintenance are printable large area and nanoscale
electronics that bring new challenges and opportunities for
fault mitigation due to their differing fabrication processes and
technology scaling.
In respect to hardware development platforms, a key goal
of future zero-maintenance strategies is to proliferate fault
detection and discrimination towards the lower design levels
in order that detection occurs closer to the actual fault locale.
This aspect is explored further in Section IV-A. It is further
expected that fault mitigation operates most effectively when
concentrated as far as possible to the same locale. To support
development of such fine-grained fault mitigation, hardware in
loop monitoring has advanced significantly in recent years to
support industrial control and monitoring platforms for high-
value sectors such as aerospace, mining, consumer transporta-
tion and exploration where even small down-time events incur
considerable financial cost. In such cases the incorporation
of built-in actions that inhibit further fault events become
extremely valuable as does the ability to record the frequency
and nature of abnormal events.
B. Implementation challenges
A precursor to eliminating effort required to maintain any
function, is to monitor it. Under nominal operational con-
ditions, dependability in electronic systems is secured when
errors arising from faults can be diagnosed. Therefore fault
detection and mitigation during normal operation becomes
paramount. Faults stem from a number of sources, including
production defects (infant mortality), ground level radiation
effects, yield challenges for next generation fabrication pro-
cesses, greatly increasing complexity of mission and safety
critical electronic systems, testability of complex systems,
highly integrated System in Package (SiP) ageing factors
especially for high power devices and ultra low voltage ASICs.
Within this survey, it is therefore assumed that the primary
faults under consideration relate to transient upsets or perma-
nent faults in each of these cases1. Therefore, several factors
make achieving zero-maintenance a challenging endeavor:
1) Provisioning for various fault types: Commonly encoun-
tered faults and errors (potentially) arising within electronics
are considered in Table IV. Such events may occur on a
time-limited basis and maybe short-lived, repetitive (persis-
tent) or periodic in nature. Upsets can cause temporary or
permanent fault conditions, but errors do not necessarily result.
Faults that do not cause immediate errors are termed sub-
critical and may lie dormant between power cycles or remain
indefinitely. Their influence upon error state is dependent
upon the system state, and therefore sub-critical faults are
1A broad discussion of such matters is found in [31], in which various
examples of fault and error manifestation are discussed.
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TABLE II
CATEGORISATION OF REVIEW LITERATURE RELATING TO ZERO-MAINTENANCE PHILOSOPHY
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Microsystems
[3] x x x x x
[4] x x x x
[5] x x x x x x
FPGA-based
[6] x x x x x
[7] x x x x x x
[8] x x x x x
[9] x x x x x x x x
[10] x x x x
[11] x x x x
Computer
architecture
[12] x x x x x x x x
[13] x x x x x
[14] x x x x x x
DRAM [15] x x x x x
Evolutionary [16] x x x x x x x x
TABLE III
CURRENT METHODS FOR RESILIENT OPERATION
Technique Context Example of state-of-the-art
Built-in self-test Perform off line integrity checks before commencing normal
operation
Power-On Self Test (POST) within computer BIOS
Online status reporting Real-time fault checking General dashboard warning light
Fault discrimination System-level diagnosis via sub-module level BIT Specific dashboard warning light
Fault monitoring Detect and log fault occurrences SMART hard disk monitoring
Fault masking Typically majority voting within modular sub-system TMR controller for safety critical plant systems
Active fault mitigation Active response to eliminate faults within logic Data scrubbing
Self-preservation Prediction and mitigation against faults Mostly found in electromechanical systems e.g., hard
drive free-fall protection
Error mitigation Correct errors that cannot be eliminated by fault mitigation EDC for memory modules
assumed to compromise system dependability. Critical faults
cause immediate, persistent and potentially cumulative errors.
Even so, there is no guarantee that errors will be immediately
observable. The susceptibility to fault-induced upsets increases
with various factors, such as increasing die area, shrink-
ing transistor gate dimension and reduced switching voltage.
These are all common drivers in microelectronics and future
nanoscale and printable electronics hence significant research
effort has been directed towards faults occurring within future
ASICs, interconnects and memory devices, especially those
faults induced by radiation particle strikes [32]. In many cases
physics of failure (PoF) models are used to help predict the
likely system response. This evidence is then used to build a
case for provision of redundant resources to be allocated at
design-time and weighing up additional cost.
2) Detecting faults: Considering board and sub-system
levels, physical breakdown of printed circuit boards (PCB)
is a major concern in high performance systems, especially
for high-voltage applications. An example of a simple fault
analysis of PCBs is summarised in Table V, where various
symptoms and related processes of elimination that involve
costly and time consuming design steps are characterised (see
also [33]). This classification exemplifies the complexity and
effort associated with maintenance where, at the sub-system
level, procedures for monitoring and assessing potential fail-
ures and mitigation strategies become increasingly complex.
In critical applications, failure modes and effects analysis
(FMEA) procedures may be employed at the system level
to form predictive models for maintenance planning. This
includes potential disruption caused by ‘No Fault Found (NFF)
scenarios and strategic provision of built-in test (BIT) logic
[34]. Indeed, BIT logic is viewed as beneficial at board and
system levels provided the additional complexity is feasible.
An example of this is shown in Table VII, where the relative
cost/benefit of BIT is estimated [35]. These factors contribute
to the overall maintainability and availability of the system
[36]. Potential causes of failures are typically assessed by
system experts and preventative or corrective courses of action
are determined. FMEA is less commonly applied to low-
level design due to the complexity of analysing all sub-
parts and hence is mostly confined to high-level integrity
analysis. Degradation is also to be considered when designing
zero-maintenance strategies; the onset of ageing may become
accelerated in the presence of persistent faults hence mitigation
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strategies offer the potential to slow this process by repair.
Detection and monitoring is also extremely useful in demand-
driven maintenance during the onset of ageing.
3) Responding according to fault severity: Systemic and
device-level faults give rise to critical errors [37], while
soft errors arise from a number of different fault conditions
[38]. In particular, dormant fault and sub-critical faults can
remain unnoticed for some time before causing errors. Further
upset mechanisms include electromagnetic interference (EMI),
thermal cycling and mechanical degradation of packaging.
Faults may also manifest as incorrect logic levels appearing at
gate inputs/outputs or else bit upsets within memory contents
(or indeed the manifestation of incorrect voltages/current com-
ponents within analogue circuitry). Different error behaviours
are possible depending upon their location and duration [39].
Examples include: errors that are overwritten and do not
cause failures; latent errors that persist but which do not
cause output failure (but may affect internal states); and errors
that are detected and corrected. A more complete model for
the relationship between faults, errors and failures has been
proposed in [31].
4) Integrated self-maintenance: Many faults manifest as
flaws during manufacture and, while these must be removed
during test and repair before the product is worthy of selling,
there is potential to continue the process of detection and repair
into the useful lifetime via runtime and POST maintenance. As
a result of yield issues, many high-density ICs contain large
pools of redundant elements that are partly consumed during
production BIST, but the remaining redundant elements and
associated BIT logic remain inactive thereafter [40]. Even after
built-in test and repair (BISTAR), it is conceivable that non-
critical faults may have been inadvertently triggered during
resource reallocation and may compromise normal operation.
BISTAR will continue to feature in future FPGAs [41], con-
figurable ASICs [42] and nanoscale electronics [43] and it has
been suggested that BISTAR logic could be made available for
runtime test or repair of logic [44] and interconnects [45].
Due to the above challenges, achieving zero-maintenance,
in its most generic form, is not an easy problem to solve. In
fact, most current maintenance design techniques solve only
specific formulations of the problem. These efforts are further
influenced by rapidly changing technology requirements and
availability as well as investment costs for development and
test, factors that are often determined by the industry domain
in which maintenance is required.
C. Formalisms of zero-maintenance
In the context of this paper, zero-maintenance can perhaps
be best viewed as a collection of capabilities that ensure
error-free operation in the presence of faults occurring
within an integrated sub-system or component, with min-
imal external intervention. This is also related to the area of
autonomous maintenance wherein autonomous systems take
on similar capabilities, for example the use of external robotic
systems to perform specific maintenance tasks [46]. A number
of related maintenance requirements can be identified within
the literature, though most come from related areas. A synopsis
is given in Table VI including an indication of state of the
art. At their most basic level, faults (and errors potentially
arising as a result) are masked and/or removed such that their
influence is no longer critical to error-free operation. Thus a
minimum condition of zero-maintenance is that all faults are
made sub-critical. By the same measure, it is also desirable
to address sub-critical faults by masking strategies. Design
for zero-maintenance therefore comprises fault-tolerant design
augmented by active detect and response capabilities such
that operational life is extended. Ideally fault-free operation
is secured.
III. QUANTIFYING ZERO-MAINTENANCE
Several metrics have been considered for quantifying the
performance of self-maintenance strategies. Their design-time
prioritisation is application-dependent and each must be evalu-
ated in terms of their reliance upon redundant and coordination
resources. Moreover, such resources must be allocated at
design-time. Existing metrics are summarised in Table VIII,
including fault capacity and performance impact. There are
few real-world examples where evaluation of these parameters
has been reported in the open literature although some detailed
FPGA studies have been summarised in [8].
An important step in the design process is test and eval-
uation of the detection and mitigation strategy. Ideally this
would be done within the actual hardware under test where
emerging fault detection and mitigation strategies will aid with
the test and verification of complex electronic systems. An
example of this is the Slackprobe design for ARM processors
that places embedded logic deep within strategic locations of
the chip for critical timing monitoring. This logic is included
within synthesis/layout steps and provides new insights into
ageing effects as the timing becomes degraded. In may cases
however the overhead associated with the test logic is high and
data collected is not directly related to fault events. Besides
embedded hardware monitoring, an alternative approach is to
implement fault injection engine during the design evaluation
phase. Fault injection is a more aggressive approach that
emulates direct fault conditions at the hardware level under
the control of a fault injection engine [52]. For low pin count
ICs, hardware electronic faults may be injected directly. High-
density devices such as ASICs and FPGAs require dedicated
internal logic [53], [54]. A comprehensive description of fault
injection techniques can be found in [55]. Fault injection has
also been discussed at the transistor, gate, device and system
level with in ASICs [56] but interconnect-related faults are not
as well understood and further work is needed especially for
self-repairing strategies [8].
Despite benefiting from mature software tools FPGAs are
not optimised for on line reconfiguration. Fine-grained Triple
Modular Redundancy (TMR) requires special considerations
as discussed in [27]. Off-the-shelf solutions do exist that
exploit either partial-reconfiguration facilities or else direct
manipulation of the configuration bitstream. Several methods
also exist for testing the resilience of FPGA strategies includ-
ing stuck-at-faults, bitstream analysis, radiation testing and
fault injection characterisation [10].
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TABLE IV
FAULTS OCCURRING WITHIN INTEGRATED CIRCUITS
Abbr. Definition Description
T
ra
n
si
en
t
SEU Single event upset Single transient fault event
SET Single event transient Transient pulse affecting gates and latches
SBU Single bit upset Logical bit inversion within register/memory
MBU Multiple bit upset Multiple register bits inversions
MCU Multiple cell upset Faults manifesting/propagating within logic cells
SEFI Single event functional interrupt Produces observable failure at cell/block output
P
er
m
a
n
en
t SHE Single hard error Caused by single fault, commonly stuck-at
SEL Single event latch-up Rail to rail short circuit in pnpn circuits
SESB Single event induced snap-back Rail to rail short circuit in nMOS circuit
SEB Single event burnout Thermal runaway in power transistors
SEGR Single event gate rupture Breakdown of gate dielectric
TABLE V
ESTABLISHED METHODS FOR PCB LEVEL TESTING AND REPAIR WITHOUT SELF-REPAIR STRATEGIES (ADAPTED FROM [33]).
Fault type Cause of failure Eliminated by Failure model
Layout Crosstalk, grounding, power rail
noise, fan-in or fan-out violations
Correct application of layout rules Stuck-at, intermittent
Construction Inappropriate interconnect design
or packaging, solder splash, bridg-
ing, dry joints
Careful construction and inspection Stuck-at, bridging
IC internal failures Fabrication defect, yield issue,
packaging defect
Careful construction, screening Stuck-at, metal-metal shorts
Environment Accelerated component degradation Use components qualified for envi-
ronment conditions
Stuck-at, intermittent
Degradation (time-
dependent)
Component ageing, modifications Preventative maintenance Stuck-at
Design and
implementation
Critical races, static/dynamic errors,
hazards
Correct design and validation Stuck-at, intermittent
TABLE VI
RELATED MAINTENANCE REQUIREMENTS REPORTED IN THE ELECTRONIC DOMAIN
Method Aim of strategy State of the art
Built-in self-test Detection of fault caused by upset at power-on
and/or run-time
Automated SMART disk reporting [47]
Fine-grained fault masking Fault masking at device level, possibly including
fault identification
PaNDA chip [42]; interleaved logic; Gaisler Pro-
cessors [48]
Built-in self-reconfiguration Capability for online or offline design reconfigura-
tion
Many lab demonstrations, but unclear whether used
commercially
Built-in self-reallocation Self-initiated reorganisation of logic fabric Fundamental research
Robust state machines State machine encoding for fault resilience Adopted in commercial designs
Self-maintenance Correction of faults in-service (active operation or
in standby). May initiate partial repair until next
scheduled maintenance.
Some commercial examples but mostly fundamen-
tal research
Survivability Continuously recover from faults, consuming re-
sources as necessary (possible at expense of per-
formance)
Systems for long-term space exploration
Self-diagnosis Ability to determine most effective course of action;
reporting of remaining repair capacity.
Some software-based techniques [49]; MEMS in-
tegrity test [50]
Self-preservation Able to reduce the impact of fault condition before
major action is required
Primarily electromechanical systems e.g., disk drive
shock protection [51].
TABLE VII
COST/BENEFIT FOR BIT, VIEWED FROM VLSI PERSPECTIVE ADAPTED FROM [35]. + COST INCREASE, - COST REDUCTION, +/- COST INCREASE LEADING
TO SAVING.
Design, test
& dev.
Fabrication
Production
testing
Mainte-
nance
testing
Diagnosis,
repair
Service
interruption
Chips +/- + -
Boards +/- + - -
Systems +/- + - - - -
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TABLE VIII
KEY PERFORMANCE METRICS FOR ASSESSING ZERO-MAINTENANCE STRATEGIES
Metric Description
R
es
p
o
n
se
Fault coverage Refers to fractional area of overall circuit that protected and
diversity of faults that can be handled
Fault granularity Minimum design layer at which faults can be detected/addressed
Fault capacity Number of remaining faults that can be sustained by mitigation
strategy
Performance reduction Loss of application performance due to zero-maintenance opera-
tions
Latency Time required for recovery
R
es
o
u
rc
es
Resource overhead Number of additional components needed over and above basic
design
Resource re-use Achieving efficient consumption of redundant resources (active
methods)
Energy usage Energy consumed during recovery and consumed by additional
resources overall
D
ia
g
n
o
st
ic Reporting Discrimination & reporting of fault events at multiple system levels
Remaining lifetime Indication of remaining operational hours after which faults will
no longer be handled
Logging Capacity to store a log of fault history and classification
IV. DESIGN MODELS FOR MITIGATION
Mitigation strategies take the form of either distributed
passive masking or active detect and respond. As noted earlier,
some are already utilised in manufacturing test and repair and,
to a lesser extent, degradation management. In the former
case detection followed by repair is sometimes referred to as
built-in test and repair (BISTAR). There is a large class of
platforms based on reconfigurable FPGAs and PLDs that are
explored later in this section. An important question is how can
the mitigation strategy determine the most appropriate level
of response? A sub-component that is affected by transient
upset will not benefit from active response capability since
unless permanent effects result; repairing temporary faults by
reallocating valuable redundant resources is extremely ineffi-
cient and would not address further occurrences of transient
upset. Fault masking would be the primary design strategy
in this case. In other cases however, the decision is less
straightforward because both transient and permanent fault
handling may be expected to occur and hence resources must
be traded against design overall cost/benefit factors. In [57]
general considerations of early fault-tolerant computers were
explored and a number of questions raised: when should
fault tolerance be considered? How do errors manifest, human
error, software fault or hardware fault? How is the benefit
quantified? As stated earlier, the motivation for fault-tolerance
has shifted from manufacturing consistency toward random
and cumulative faults caused by environmental and ageing
factors.
To help set the context for design for zero-maintenance
a suggested relationship between fault severity and design
mitigation as given in Fig. 1 for a non-specific sub-component.
A similar view was suggested by Noura et al in the context
of resilient control systems [25]. The view presents several
typical design considerations: the absolute of limit of fault tol-
erance, the regions of applicability for each class of fault han-
dling and the performance degradation for more sophisticated
Fault severity
SEU Permanent fault /ageing
M
e
tr
ic
Target 
performance
Performance
Migaon method
Recongura on Realloca on
Mask
Fig. 1. Progressive strategy for fault-tolerant mitigation with performance
impact (adapted from [25]).
fault handling procedures. The anticipated impact on sub-
component performance somewhat qualitative, but is indicative
of the benefits of employing more complex maintenance
strategies. Resource restructuring is a simple concept, but in
practice involves a complex hardware reorganisation process
that requires coordination and accurate fault diagnostics. This
tends to become especially complex for current reconfigurable
FPGA designs such as STAR (self-test and repair) [58] that
is capable of detecting and isolating faulty logic by activating
spare logic, but which requires significant external processing
resources.
A. Passive methods
Significant advances in electronics fabrication and packag-
ing methods have taken place over the past decades and the
perceived reliability and dependability of resulting ASICs is
high. In recent years a re-emergence of passive mitigation has
occurred in part to a response to new nanoscale electronics
but also the onset of SEUs within current-generation ASICs.
The most prevalent passive fault-tolerant strategy is n-modular
JOURNAL OF LATEX CLASS FILES, VOL. 14, NO. 8, AUGUST 2017 8
(a) (c)(b)
A1
A2
A3
A4
A5
A6
a1
a2
a4
a3 a6
a5
A1
A2
A3
Voter
A1
A2
A3
Voter
Σ
Fig. 2. Majority strategies for fine-grained redundancy. (a) basic majority
using logical voter (b) full majority logical voter (c) weighted analogue
majority signal formed by summation of weighted contributions. In this
example output of each module A1, A2, ..., A6 is weighted according to
a1, a2, ...a6.
redundancy (nMR) involving majority signalling. An early
review of nMR design considerations for computer hardware
is provided by Carter [13] while fundamental nMR concepts
may be traced back to the much-cited work of Von Neumann
[59] that was inspired by solutions observed in biological
systems that construct resilient systems out of many spare
components. Each component is assumed prone to failure
and hence error-free operation is secured in the presence of
faults through massively redundant node, interconnections and
majority signal blocks. Various majority signalling methods
have been proposed including partial and full majority (Fig.
2a-b) and summing (Fig. 2c). More recently, fault masking
has again arisen as a key approach in nanoscale design but
for now utilising small n [60]. Numerous variations on this
theme exist, each bringing their own performance / resource
trade-off at the fine-grained transistor or logic gate levels.
The potential impact on availability and cost of ownership
brought about by fault masking is considered further by
Maxion [14]. Proven fault handling measures include self-
purging [61], where the classical nMR with voter structure
is modified to provide explicit fault detection and isolation of
each module. The required switching mechanism constitutes a
departure from purely fault masking to detect-isolate actions.
In this case the overall reliability is highly dependent upon
the individual switching reliability. Further augmentations to
the TMR approach were suggested in [39] to include explicit
detection and handling of transient and permanent errors.
In this scheme, fault detection and self-reassertion of the
correct logic state is possible within individual modules. In
addition detect-isolate is performed when a permanent fault
occurs in a single module, in which case the design reverts
to a master/checker scheme. Although this implementation
does not include a full self-reconfiguration implementation,
it is attractive because there is minimal logic overhead in
comparison to the conventional TMR implementation. Of
course, the high resource overhead of the TMR scheme itself
is still present.
Graceful degradation is difficult to achieve by passive
methods due to the inherently limited fault capacity. Although
detection is not directly involved, it is possible to extract
and utilise majority signals for basic diagnostics. This is
done at the modular level to generate enumerated states such
as ‘ok’, ‘fault has occurred but still ok’, ‘cannot tolerate
further faults’ (critical condition) and ‘unavailable’. Although
feasible at the modular sub-system levels, their implementation
requires considerable design effort at lower levels (i.e. closer
to the origin of fault) and hence new architectures are needed
to support this level of granularity. The benefits are clearly
significant for integrity monitoring in the presence of transient
upsets.
1) Bottom-up design methods: Fine-grained strategies have
seen specific interest recently owing to concerns over the
vulnerabilities of emerging nanoscale and to some extent
state-of-the-art printable electronics. At the lowest design
levels, provisioning of redundant transistors has been discussed
for compensating yield tolerance occurring during manufac-
ture [62]. Such strategies inevitably involve compromises,
namely redundancy overhead, complexity of fault detection
and degradation of performance through the use of non-
optimal transistors. However, within the zero-maintenance
paradigm the benefits of graceful and predictable degradation
and self management of faults are extremely attractive. At the
sub-system level, online fault discrimination and monitoring
operates at the modular level and within maintenance-heavy
products, such as land, air and space vehicles, it becomes
possible to monitor component aging via key response factors
that that are expected to degrade more progressively over
time [2]. These methods focus on self-correction of stuck-
at faults within nanoscale logic units, for which there are two
reasons to consider fine-grained redundancy: firstly, fabrication
processes are more prone to defect and variability [63] and
the high density of nanoscale manufacturing exacerbates the
challenge of high volume production. Secondly, the reduced
device dimensions will result in increased susceptibility to in-
service faults. With the advent of Large Scale Integrated (LSI)
ICs, fine-grained redundancy was employed in mission critical
electronic systems such the flight computer of the Apollo lunar
mission. Its use was ultimately restricted due to improvements
in manufacturing tolerances and the unfavourable view of
maintenance at the time [64]. Increasing component density
brings a number of issues relating to upset vulnerability and
manufacturing defect that must be reduced so that these tech-
nologies are able to complete with current silicon technologies.
Further considerations include reduced operating and threshold
voltage that, together with higher feature density, will lead to
lower SEU immunity. Defect mitigation commands the highest
effort in the first instance [31] but a number of approaches
nonetheless been reported in recent years as summarised in
Table IX.
nMR has also been incorporated within FPGA config-
urations at the block level [65], extended to fine-grained
gate redundancy by a method closely related to quadded
logic[60] and ultimately appearing at the transistor level via
N-modulo redundancy (nMR) [66] and most commonly TMR
implementations [67]. A further variation involves scrubbing
in which the configuration is periodically refreshed from a
golden bitstream [68]. This method is very popular due to its
simplicity although service interruption does occur. In [43],
multiplexed redundancy was considered at the lowest design
levels to improve the reliability of logic gates. Future space
exploration will further leverage fine-grained strategies wher-
ever possible, principally because of the additional complexity
of incorporating design for active repair [66]. Essentially,
once a fault masking strategy has been determined it may be
JOURNAL OF LATEX CLASS FILES, VOL. 14, NO. 8, AUGUST 2017 9
(a)
(b) (c)
Fig. 3. Fine-grained passive redundancy principal for electronics. (a) quad
transistor structure (b) standard CMOS NAND logic gate (c) equivalent quad
redundant NAND design.
applied fairly readily to hierarchical logic designs, whether
fine-grained, cell or block level although evaluation of its
resulting impact fault rate behaviour and associated reliability
still needs to be performed. In [43], Han and Jonker noted
that different strategies are likely to be required to address
transient and permanent (and defect) related failures since the
underlying binomial distribution applied to examine transient
upset behaviour is unsuitable for modelling permanent faults,
where statistical independence can no longer be assumed.
Majority voting may occur as a function of the topology of
the functional gate [69], the principle being to eliminate the
classical voter logic by a summation of electrical currents at a
common node. In this instance RoRa (reliability-oriented place
and route) algorithms may be employed to instantiate TMR-
like structures and evaluate them using V-Place, a model-
based tool that uses a topology heuristic to assess and recover
performance metrics.
Information redundancy is a further long-established ap-
proach distinguished by the fact that errors are allowed to
occur and must be corrected. Although mainly as active miti-
gation there exists hardware designs that exploit this approach
when errors can be tolerated. For example, computing in the
presence of noise caused by SEUs can be achieved when the
numerical error created by an upset does not impinge upon
the accuracy of the output [77].
B. Active methods
In contrast to fault-masking redundancy methods, fault
detection and reconfiguration aim to achieve fault tolerance
via BISR capability. Sometimes this is referred to as built-in
self-test and repair (BISTAR), the result of combining BIT
and BIST. The contrasting behaviour of active and passive
strategies is exemplified by revising Fig.1 where, for active
strategies, redundant resources are called upon (and consumed)
by rising fault severity. By contrast, passive strategies possess
much more limited fault capacity in the form of redundant
resource but offer fast recovery. Active methods are armed
with sufficient resources to maintain a consistently higher fault
capacity but with longer recovery times after each fault event.
In the ideal case a combined strategy would only address
transient faults by the masking method and permanent faults
by the active method.
BISTAR initiates a direct response to an upset event in
the form of active alteration of the functional logic (and
possibly additional dormant logic). BISTAR is fundamentally
different to passive mitigation in that a measured response is
taken by reorganising internal resources. The variety of active
mitigation methods is summarised in Table X. Reorganisation
usually involves a process of fault detection and localisation
(possibly automated but most likely manual) followed by
replacement of faulty logic with logic that is assumed to
be fully functional. An example partial reconfiguration of
an FPGA by user-initiated loading of a new bitstream after
detecting a problem is suspected. This type of maintenance
assistance can be highly sophisticated however it does not
constitute self-repair. Self-diagnosis should also be qualified
here: many circuits contain BIT hardware that is designed
to enhance the fault detection process, however these mostly
require external test hardware to be connected in order to
achieve diagnosis capability [78].
Built-in test (BIT) logic was originally created for produc-
tion test and repair but lacks the detection capability proposed
for online mitigation [79]. This approach has been refined
over the years to improve the efficiency of production test,
including the introduction of self-repair logic in memory
chips. For example, redundant row and column cells for
more efficient repair [80] is essentially a more straightforward
reallocation process whereby resources are reorganised to cir-
cumvent defects. Once processed by the production tester, the
configuration remains locked for the remaining lifetime of the
component. The envisaged diagnostic, resource and response
performance/cost trade-offs were considered in Table VIII and
clearly the incorporation of self-repairing capabilities needs
additional resources beyond those envisaged for the production
test and repair. An example of this is seen in adaptive cache
design where a variable trade-off is implemented in hardware
[81].
1) Detection and classification: Detection in electronic
sub-systems can occur online, during the active operation
with minimal service interruption or offline, performed when
the system is placed in a special diagnostic mode or else
during power on self-test. Present-day detection is typically
implemented using some form of boundary scan logic that is
made available during offline test. In complex systems this is
usually performed during regular or emergency maintenance
and inspection. Offline detection is commonplace in produc-
tion test and repair during which dedicated logic is activated
to facilitate the test and repair process [35]. Notably however,
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TABLE IX
BOTTOM-LEVEL DESIGN METHODOLOGIES FOR ELECTRONICS
Method Example Mechanism(s)
Quad-structures [70], [71]
Quad transistors arranged in serial/parallel
fault tolerance. Output is formed from
majority of pull up/down resistor current.
N2-transistor structures [72]
Massively-redundant micro-architectures;
variant of quad structures.
Triple transistor structures for
CMOS logic
[73]
Triple transistor redundancy scheme for
minimal area overhead.
Yield enhancement for next-gen
electronics
[74], [75]
Redundant transistors designed to be
allocated only during production test
Interleaved logic and
interconnect
[60]
Send multiple copies of logic levels to
redundant gates so that output is calculated
several times. This provides majority output
and can be arranged to inherently mask
certain faults.
Multiplexed redundancy [43] Redundancy via additional interconnections
FPGA configuration [76]
Provisioning additional resources ar
programmable block level
TABLE X
ACTIVE MITIGATION STRATEGIES
Method State of the art Example
Offline test and
repair (BISTAR)
Resources organised during test mode.
Valid for chip, package and SoC level test
& diagnostics.
[15], [44], [35]
Fine-grained
reallocation
Transistor-level reorganisation using
switch-over.
[82]
Online test and
repair
Fault & mitigation for critical sub-systems
that must not be interrupted; integrated
self-test & repair.
Autonomous fault management; ECSS F3
on-board fault management [83]
Error mitigation
Errors permitted to occur then corrected at
data level
[48], [84]
Self-healing
Autonomic reorganisation, possibly without
explicit detection;
FLASH memory recovery, self-healing
materials; interconnect possible but very
low TRL. [85], [86]
complexity is retained within production test units that are only
available during production. Extensions have been proposed
that increase the on-chip complexity in lieu of faster overall
test procedures [87]. Beyond production BIT and BIST, the
principles of detection lies within the wider research area of
anomaly detection [88]. For example, at higher system levels
cluster analysis is a powerful data-driven approach for system-
level health monitoring and diagnostic [89]. However, in the
context of this paper it is assumed that detection logic is
needed much closer to the point of origin of faults, requiring
a step-change in design and integration practices. The goal
has become to ensure that errors are not permitted to manifest
within electronic logic, interconnections and memory. Fault
discrimination is a critical augmentation of detection and
opportunities exist within microelectronics design to integrate
detection and discrimination close to the point of fault, includ-
ing assessment of the seriousness of fault. This is made all
the more important given detection is the first step towards all
active mitigation strategies. In contrast, masking approaches
do not depend upon online fault detection, but instead majority
signals are produced that, in turn, generate signals that reflect
the current integrity in the presence of threats. Logging and
reporting of fault events is clearly a further desirable feature
within the general maintenance model, however detection and
counting of transient upsets is not trivial. Active mitigation
is however very well-suited to status monitoring even before
active recovery is considered.
There are examples when fault detection is not used but
instead the masking strategy is primed to initiate a default re-
sponse should particular error occur. Examples include switch-
over [36], RAID data storage and error detection and cor-
rection (EDC) codes. EDC operates by exploring redundancy
applied at the information level by data coding. This differs
from hardware mitigation since errors are allowed to manifest
and are then corrected. In contrast, hardware methods seek
to prevent errors from arising when faults occur. EDC is
however extremely popular in memory ICs due to regular
architecture of memory cells that allows direct application
of data codes. An abstraction between hardware and EDC
strategies is sometimes apparent for example, in the protection
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of configuration bitstreams for FPGAs. In this case EDC is
used to protect data patterns that are in turn responsible for
hardware configuration [9]. However the respective detection
strategies are still distinct. A further example is when EDC
applied to protect look up tables (LUT) that in turn implement
finite state machines (FSM). Whereas the FSM is traditionally
implemented as a combination of LUT data and execution
logic, it is possible in some cases to implement the FSM
almost entirely out of memory and therefore EDC becomes
the predominant detection mechanism. Alternatively, fault
tolerance may be encoded at the state level [90]. Once again,
errors are allowed to occur and exist until repaired by the EDC
strategy. A further variation of this case is when the FSM is
provisioned with both hardware fault mitigation and EDC, thus
protecting against different fault mechanisms [84]. Detection
also appears in the context of self-healing technologies [22]
where autonomic responses are triggered upon certain events.
In Table XI a summary of fault detection strategies related
mostly to modular designs is presented.
Fine-grained built-in test (BIT) strategies represent an im-
portant step towards zero-maintenance capability in electronic
sub-systems because they require that faulty conditions are
identified and localised before the response is formulated.
Another case is that of remotely activated BIST using the
System JTAG (SJTAG) method [91] wherein the test itself is
offline but is activated by a remote data centre. By comparison,
online detection is still in its relative infancy but will bring
the facility to identify faults during normal operation with
minimal impact on overall performance. Zero-maintenance
requires considerably more complex design effort to gather
useful information to inform the recovery process. One future
strategy is to make extensive use of hardware fault detection
at the lowest design levels in conjunction with fine-grained
redundant design with new BIT logic [92]. This marks a
departure from the reliance upon traditional external test units
and a step towards online BIST.
Chip- and board-level system considerations are also impor-
tant, especially the integrity of interconnects. This is an espe-
cially challenging area that has been considered as part of the
boundary scan approach [45]. There has been limited progress
in this area although IEEE standard 1149.1 has evolved to
cater for multi-chip modules (MCMs) [93], on-chip test and
even hardware emulation and debug. Analogue time-domain
refractometry (TDR) approaches have also been proposed to
improve fault coverage and retain low MCM complexity [94].
In most cases online operation is not considered and hence the
addition of field support phase capability has been discussed
with respect to modified boundary scan hardware [44] and
could potentially be applied at the board or system levels.
This would essentially constitute an automated approach to
circumvention of localised board issues. Beyond this however,
there is a great need for further work in interconnect-level fault
detection they represent critical points of failure and methods
are confined to production test [95].
2) Self-reconfiguration: Off-the-shelf FPGA devices con-
tain reconfiguration logic coordinated by user-provided config-
uration bitstream that has been generated by software design
tools and is typically fixed at design-time. These devices have
become highly popular and have been identified as critical
to system dependability in many applications [96]. At the
same time, SoC platforms such as the Zync and Cyclone
SoC include integrated processors for runtime reconfiguration
of programmable FPGA resources including logic, LUTs,
memory and interconnects. The principle of reconfiguring
resources within an FPGA in response to faults is discussed
in [97], noting that the configuration fabric itself remains
fixed. Resource utilisation in such cases rarely approaches
100% and therefore unused memory blocks, look up tables,
logic resources are available even within complex designs. The
challenge associated reconfiguration however lies in effective
detection, coordination and resource coverage within the de-
tection strategy. Since access to available resources tend to be
clustered with limited granularity, coverage must be carefully
managed otherwise available resources may not be accessible.
An external governing process is usually needed that oper-
ates online or offline depending on the implementation. This
process may take one of two forms: alternative pre-verified
bitstreams stored externally and loaded into the device [98]
or direct manipulation of the live bitstream by an internal
or external governing process. Embedded or software-defined
processors have been proposed as part of this but are con-
sidered analogous to external processors in terms of resource
usage. Sophisticated algorithms such as the STAR approach
[99] attempt to self-manage dynamic resource allocation by
quarantining active logic that is under test, with the intention
that areas of memory and logic affected by faults are less likely
to generate errors.
Besides FPGA chips, reconfiguration is also performed
within multi-processor hardware where, again, the underlying
logic fabric remains fixed but the resource utilisation is dy-
namically managed by software techniques depending on fault
conditions. Typical examples include load balancing and ther-
mal management as well as modular standby sub-components.
Finally, the fault-tolerant properties of neural networks have
been investigated by incorporating TMR principles into the
network [100]. A summary of key design features expected of
reconfigurable computer systems can be found in Table XII.
The most flexible of all active response strategies involves
dynamic resource reallocation using a generic pool of re-
sources. Here, the underlying logic fabric itself may be al-
tered and manipulated in response to persistent fault events.
Dynamic allocation involves substitution of faulty logic and
interconnect with healthy hardware in response to a variety of
fault conditions. Successful strategies include heterogeneous
architectures arranged as a pool of available resources with
multiple fixed logic designs that achieve the same task, but
each of which have different fault behaviours, thus providing
resilience against systemic failures [101]. Kothe (2006) dis-
cusses a method for direct reconfiguration at the fine-grained
transistor level [82] where a switching fabric is included at the
transistor level. Self-coordination at the logic cell level uses
simple trigger-based signals to activate or deactivate each cell.
This method is related to bio-inspired cellular arrays, and in
particular cellular automata, whose functionality is defined by
DNA-like instructions stored by cells organised as a regular
array structure. This approach is conceptually attractive due to
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TABLE XI
FUNDAMENTAL DETECTION CAPABILITIES FOR ZERO-MAINTENANCE
Method Mechanism
Checkpointing
Save known good state for potential future roll-back. Usually
software implemented.
Spare module
A duplicate module exists in either online or offline state. This is
activated when a problem is detected. Requires fault detection.
Duplicate & match
Primitive of TMR: perform same operation twice and compare
results. Often implemented using design diversity i.e., two
different implementations are used to help avoid systemic errors.
Hardware error
detection and
correction (EDC)
Generally performed on data to be stored and transmitted.
Redundancy is introduced into the data set itself such that certain
errors caused by fault are detected and corrected.
Temporal redundancy Time-sharing of resources in order to generate majority vote.
State machine
encoding
Protection by inserting of redundant states that indicate error
states.
Virtual TMR
Uses reconfigurable logic blocks to implement TMR when
configured correctly. Implementations can be dynamic.
System-level voting
Abstract levels of majority voting to determine system
correctness at high level e.g. software level in computing.
Somewhat independent of underlying hardware and does not
provide indication of cause of error.
TABLE XII
FEATURES FOUND IN RECONFIGURABLE SYSTEMS
Feature Description
Reprogrammable Configuration by bitstream or machine code, which can be updated and reloaded.
Configuration means Access to configuration bitstream (FPGAs) or instruction memory (processors)
Regular architecture Multiple identical arrays of logic and memory fabric arranged in a regular fashion.
Embedded processors
Specific to FPGAs: software-defined processor allow complex task management with
hardware resource abstraction.
Partial reconfiguration
Pre-verified configurations (FPGA) or machine code (processors) primed for fast
reconfiguration of select resources without halting active task.
the relatively simple rule sets that govern global functionality.
Other instances of self-organisation include dynamic re-
allocation of microprocessors workloads in the event of a
failed worker [102] and self-assembly of patterns by conver-
gent cellular automata that are used to coordinate functional
logic cells [103]. The latter achieves self-reassembly of the
correct configuration even in the event that every cells state is
randomised. The Plastic Cellular Architecture (PCA) has also
been suggested [104] taking the form of a CA coordination
layer together with a reconfigurable functional logic layer
called a ”reconfigurable plane”. Taken together, they form
a self-reconfiguring logic mechanism even though self-repair
was not the original focus of this work. Evolutionary algo-
rithms may also be applied to drive self-reconfiguration [105]
in which the rule sets are dynamically evolved over time. In
[106] a self-recovery mechanism based on a diffusion model is
demonstrated using a reconfigurable hardware platform. A fur-
ther approach uses the redundant genetic information observed
in prokaryote organisms to create an artificial prokaryote that
controls circuit configuration [107].
V. TOWARDS A DESIGN STRATEGY FOR
ZERO-MAINTENANCE
From the above overview, it is clear that a multitude
of strategies relating to maintenance exists that should be
carefully matched to the application. This section attempts
to set out a forward strategy for designing zero-maintenance
into electronic sub-systems and components with reference to
the literature classified according to the components of zero-
maintenance. A summary of applicable methods is set out in
Table XIII in terms of passive and active mechanisms.
For the case of transient upset mitigation the resource
requirement is likely to be fixed and the degree of overhead is
directly linked to expected fault frequency and corresponding
fault capacity. Active mitigation strategies are capable of
dynamically issuing redundant elements during the course
of operation but resource allocation is considerably more
complex and must be determined at design-time. Therefore,
redundant resources depicted in Fig. 1 will consumed as
cumulative permanent faults occur over time.
An example design for mitigation is seen in for control
systems and signal processing applications, where it was noted
that system performance degradation is traded for enhanced
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fault-tolerance [25], [108], [109]. This compromise was gen-
eralised in Fig. 1 to include redundant resource requirement.
As previously discussed, passive strategies mitigate through
masking faults without explicit detection and seek to continue
in the presence of those faults without error. Active strategies
rely instead upon explicit fault detection before taking action
to remove faulty logic. Clearly it is important in the latter case
to avoid false alarms triggered by transient faults that cannot
be effectively handled by an active response. Even when
considering the advancements made key questions remain:
how is the integrity of redundant resources ensured, should
they be trusted? This may merit a self-test of standby resources
before their allocation in response to fault events. A related
issue is integrity of redundant resource pool monitoring and
communication of remaining resources to the upper design
levels. Last but not least–how can integrity of checking logic
be ensured?
A. Design Perspectives
High-value industrial systems are synonymous with high
recurring maintenance, repair and overhaul effort that increases
the overall cost of through-life support [1]. Failures associated
with electronic sub-components lead to costly repair activity
and down-time, a symptom that is on the increase within elec-
tronic components. OEM and system integrators therefore seek
new design methods driven within the electronics domain by
increasing IC density, shrinking transistor critical dimension,
aggressive voltage and frequency scaling and increasingly
complex interconnect and packaging.
Evidence of existing design aspects in that relate zero-
maintenance in electronics has been gathered in Table VI,
while a deeper analysis of passive mitigation strategies is
presented in Table XIV. Although several instances relate to
production test and repair, EDC has appeared within low-
level hardware including FSM logic. Fine-grained transistor
level strategies have matured in production yield enhancement
but further opportunities exist to extend this to through-
life operation. An alternative yield method relates to direct
mitigation against signal delays caused variability in sequential
logic components such as flip flops [110]. nMR methods have
seem most use within masking strategies, including quad-
redundancy, but are generally limited to TMR within FPGAs.
In the latter case, FPGA reconfiguration is not necessary since
the strategy allocates fixed resources for fault masking. By
contrast, active methods are classified in Table XV including
custom ASIC, COTS FPGA and mixed signal strategies. There
is a good representation of both online and offline approaches–
though again modular methods are limited to n ≤ 4.
A significant challenge to zero-maintenance is that signifi-
cant design effort must be invested at the outset on minimising
susceptibility to error events that are prevalent to the appli-
cation. In some cases it becomes economically infeasible or
technically implausible to eliminate fault events. An example
is radiation hardening, which can be achieved using special
shielding materials, but adds design complexity in order to
meet thermal and weight specifications. An alternative is to
use rad-hard chips that are considerably more expensive and
are typically not available in current-generation designs unless
full custom design is undertaken. Indeed the current trend is to
use state of the art commercial and off-the-shelf (COTS) chips
due to their higher performance and lower power consumption.
This is true even for high-value sectors such as transport and
space exploration that need high performance and reliability.
The automotive industry is now using high performance SoC
wherein critical sub-systems (steering, braking) run concur-
rently with non-critical services (entertainment and navigation
interfaces) all with low power consumption.
Integration of both passive and active strategies is likely
since each brings their specific benefits and by the fact that
various fault scenarios might be encountered during through-
life operation. Combined strategies have been considered in
robust microprocessors for some time–an early example seen
in [126], where modular redundancy was used. Modern strate-
gies tend to be more concentrated towards the fine grained
levels while retaining some degree of modular redundancy
at higher design levels. Though by no means complete, the
Tables XIV & XV illustrate the breadth of techniques in use or
demonstrated in principle. Yet integrated design methodologies
are comparatively under-developed. Recognising the need for
an integrated view, Henkel (2014) proposes a map of ‘Multi-
layer dependability modelling and optimization’ for electron-
ics micro-architectures in [12] that demonstrates the wide
range of available design options. In addition, advancements
in hardware and open-source software have been accelerated
for implementing concepts related to deep learning and support
libraries. These include improvements in Graphical Processing
Units (GPUs) as well as work on other technologies such
as FPGAs, Tensor Processing Units (TPUs), and other chip
systems and architectures that match specific artificial intel-
ligence (AI) and machine learning requirements [89]. With
an emphasis on bridging these gaps in AI, novel chips are
being built to support different computing models. E.g., Intel is
introducing an AI-oriented processor the Intel Nervana Neural
Network Processor which is a purpose-built architecture for
deep learning, and Huawei’s Kirin 970 mobile AI computing
platform. Such technology platforms not only influences per-
formance but also cut down costs for organisations who will
be making use of these systems in the future.
Generalising to higher design layers or cross-layer tech-
niques, allow us to bring benefits to more than one design
level, and are essential in order to leverage the investment
of zero-maintenance resources. As an example, re-use of
fault information generated at device levels for higher levels,
e.g., using fault information generated during fault masking
operations at the application layer during maintenance assess-
ment would achieve greater design benefits. The qualitative
relationship between performance and resource metrics was
illustrated in Fig. 1. There is, however, a lack of detailed
trade-off analysis for different methods. A top-level view
of the possible operations involved within a complex zero-
maintenance design is depicted in Fig. 5. Note that, although
masking is included in this scheme, there is no active response.
As discussed in Section IV-B1, fault event monitoring and
reporting is particular to the zero-maintenance paradigm and
should be carried out in all cases i.e., passive or active fault
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TABLE XIII
FUNDAMENTAL ZERO-MAINTENANCE DESIGN STRATEGIES
Strategy Mechanism
Active or
passive
Example recovery mechanism (if
applicable)
Fault quarantine Limit spread of fault Passive None, but may assist future repair
Fault detection
Built-in checking for
presence of faults
Active
Masking voters; next-gen boundary
scan; error-detection
Fault masking
Continue in presence of
faults
Passive
nMR; EDC; reduced precision;
interleaving; FSM-coding
Retry/scrub Simple fault eradication Active Not a direct repair operation
Fault classify
Detect and report on fault
events
Active
None; but important for status and
active mitigation
Self-reconfiguration
Adapt to eradicate
permanent faults
Active Autonomous FPGA reconfiguration
Self-healing
Reallocate resources and
combine multiple methods.
Both
Self-healing materials; cellular
automata
TABLE XIV
CLASSIFICATION OF PROMINENT PASSIVE MASKING STRATEGIES (FIXED CONFIGURATION)
Method Article T
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Fault mask-
ing
[60] x x x x
[73] x x x
[72] x x x x
[59] x x x
[43] x x x x
[42] x x x
Error Correc-
tion
[4] x x
[48] x x
[84] x x
[111] x x x
[112] x x x
[113] x x x
FPGA imple-
mented
[6] x x x
[27] x x
[114] x x x
[115] x x x
and so that trends such as varying SEU rates may be analysed.
Fault management via active mitigation is a desirable concept
in zero-maintenance that has not yet seen adoption acceptance
within critical applications such as transportation (aviation,
rail, automotive) and space. Further complications face active
strategies that display complex behaviour since their complex
behaviour can be difficult to certify. A further factor is a lack
of standards though progress is being made in autonomous
vehicles and space exploration [83].
B. Hierarchical perspective
Design for zero-maintenance must lead to higher intrinsic
systems robustness and dependability while at the same time
reducing the overall complexity and frequency of maintenance
operations. Lessons have been learned in some high-volume
electronic products, such as electromechanical hard disk drives
[127], where the traditional assumptions about hazards rates
for early and useful life periods do not apply in the same way
as for previous electronic ICs. This gave rise to initiatives
for introducing built-in test and self-diagnosis capabilities
[128]. In addition, health monitoring utilises external sensor
data for accelerated testing to better understand degradation
effects [129]. It is notable, however, that these methods are
hardware/software codependent and thus are coordinated at
the higher system levels.
A useful perspective is to regard zero-maintenance as a
multi-level design problem in similar fashion to the highly in-
tegrated nature of electronic systems design. An early analysis
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TABLE XV
CLASSIFICATION OF PROMINENT ACTIVE MITIGATION STRATEGIES BASED ON RECONFIGURATION
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Time-shared
redundancy
[3] x x x
[112] x x x
[116] x x x
ASIC
(fine-grained)
[82] x x x
[117] x x x
ASIC,
(heterogeneous)
[106] x x
[118] x x
[119] x x x
[120] x x x
FPGA
implementations
[99] x x x
[121] x x x
[122] x x x
[123] x x x x
Analogue &
mixed-signal
[77] x x x x
[86] x x
[124] x x
[125] x x
of the cost/benefit expected from traditional BIT techniques for
VLSI was provided by Agrawal in 1993 [35]. More recently,
Henkel provided a categorization of strategies specific to on-
chip systems [130], where the priority areas of manufacturing
variability, ageing, soft-errors and hardware mitigation were
identified as key to design for resilience. This viewpoint can
be broadened slightly to include key system levels of interest
to zero maintenance:
• Application level: fault reporting, fault capacity, assess-
ment and scheduling of swap-out or refurbishment
• Software level: resource awareness and adaptability e.g.,
multiple core management; software fault flagging
• Integrated hardware level: board and interconnect failures
between sub-module interconnections and wiring looms;
interfaces for diagnostic information, power-on self-test
• Integrated chip level: System-on-Chip and micro-
architectures; cellular reallocation; reconfiguration; adap-
tive analogue methods
• Cell, gate and transistor levels: component redundancy;
individual fault masking and detection; variability and
yield compensation
From this analysis, we suggest the design hierarchy model in
Figure 4 that considers the technological categories relevant
to zero-maintenance and requirement for fault prognostics and
diagnostics.
Further inspiration is found in technologies for extreme
harsh environments such as unmanned space exploration mis-
sion will require ultra-reliable craft and vehicles for long-
term colonisation [131]. For these cases, future developments
will need to address enhanced resilience against component
ageing, thermal stressing and soft/hard-errors. A variety of
Fig. 4. Proposed hierarchy of design for zero maintenance in electronics.
In respect to fault prognostics/diagnostics, a solid arrow suggests the flow of
fault awareness and action taken while a dashed arrow suggests information
flow only.
self-healing technologies are likely to contribute, albeit each
having realistic limitations. An example of this is recovery of
flash memory technology via built-in energy pulsing [132].
Annealing of the wear characteristic was demonstrated but
under specific conditions. Intense radiation is a major concern
not only for exploration but also avionics and satellites and
is the subject of many studies [133]. Fine-grained redundancy
for autonomous applications has been discussed for situations
in which human intervention is hazardous or impossible with
applications in deep sea exploration, nuclear inspection, deep
drilling and mining [134], [135]. Fault events cause serious
consequences for safety critical systems and often require
costly fault-finding and maintenance. When subjected to one
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or more of these influences the resulting sub-system behaviour
can be somewhat complex and difficult to predict. One pos-
sible model considers faults occurring at different system
levels in electronic components wafer (transistor, interconnect,
metal layers on wafer), packaging (ASIC, FPGA, package
wires, chip to chip connections, SoC interconnects) and sub-
component (PCB, packaging, cables and connectors). However
it is not clear from this how errors proliferate into malfunctions
across different systems levels. This is compounded by the
challenge of fault detection and location. FMEA originated
from the design of flight electronic systems in the 1950s [136]
and specifically aims to identify corrective actions needed to
prevent failures by an exhaustive analysis of system com-
ponents and identification of failure modes and probabilities
and possible detection and recovery action steps. PSPICE
modeling can be helpful in determining component ratings
(thermal, voltage/current and noise) and to recommend de-
rating where necessary.
From the above discussion, it is clear that a structured design
methodology is required to address zero-maintenance within
electronics. With this in mind a breakdown of key challenges
with this model is proposed in Table XVI, in which key mech-
anisms are described according to known existing strategies
together with potential benefits and challenges in the context
of zero-maintenance. There is evidence of similar hierarchical
considerations at the lower design levels in [137], where a
BISR architecture is defined up to the cellular hardware level.
Since the available passive and active methods span all
hardware layers from fine-grained logic to reconfigurable logic
fabric, it necessary to integrate design strategies across most
hardware design levels. Within this structure, it is important
to consider the specific benefits to real-world maintenance
aspects and in particular effective detection and integration
with software methods. By way of example, GPUs provide an
interesting case in point because they already utilise a variety
of error-handling strategies. Depending upon the architecture
used a combination of low-level hardware EDC to protect
vulnerable high-density memory areas [138] and a high-level
error tolerance due to the visual latitude of the application
is exploited [26]. There is however some debate over the
benefit of low-level hardware EDC protection since software
redundant methods have also been shown to be effective [139].
Furthermore, this model generally allows errors to manifest
rather than mitigating against the underlying faults. A fault-
tolerant design approach faces similar design decisions.
Evidence of package-level mitigation (Table II) and inter-
connect fault handling (Table XIV) exists. However there is
a great need for enhanced test and verification for state of
the art system on chip (SoC) and system in package (SiP)
technologies for supporting design validation as well as fault-
handling. This need straddles multiple design levels, with fault
detection and status monitoring placed as close as possible to
the point of origin of faults. The hierarchical model extends
further to electro-mechanical interfaces, as seen in MEMS
integrated design [140][141][142], and ultimately into the
higher software layers.
C. Application-specific considerations
Fault mitigation has in-part driven the evolution of some
COTS devices such as FPGA and microcontrollers. Radation-
hardened FGPAs have been developed but functional resilience
capabilities have also been introduced for fault tolerance.
The potential impact of fault-tolerance within FPGAs has
been considered at the electromechanical system level of a
robot [143]. Specific examples discussed earlier in Section IV
included bitstream EDC, managed partial reconfiguration and
runtime manipulation of the configuration, each of which may
be exploited in mission critical applications and online [144].
COTS ICs have also acquired EDC protection for internal
registers and on-chip redundancy although such measures do
not address the problem of eliminating faults at the outset [48],
[4]. Furthermore, state of the art reconfigurable platforms now
contain their own hard-wired microprocessor cores (and even
larger pools of SRAM) fully integrated on-chip and therefore
on line detect and thus self-repair has become an important
area of research. Once again this indicates a merging between
passive and active fault mitigation for microprocessors and
reconfigurable platforms.
A clear assessment of technology readiness level (TRL)
for zero-maintenance methods is difficult due to the emergent
nature of most methods. Examples of state-of-the-art are listed
in Table XVII based on the known examples. Factors that
influence technology readiness include co-software/hardware
demonstration level, proven reliability of the design and
assessment of potential impact on fabrication cost. This is
evident in examples of microprocessor design [19], pro-
grammable logic chips [42] and RF microelectronics [86].
Future applications include security (attack and defend), FDIR
(Fault detection, isolation, recovery) and ISHM (Integrated
System Health Management) [131]. An important indicator in
this context will be integration readiness level (IRL) proposed
for evaluating the complexity of integrating related strategies
into existing space exploration systems [145].
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND OUTLOOK
Over the past few years, a number of maintenance re-
quirements have emerged within engineering systems and
have gained considerable focus in the areas of detection,
classification and self-recovery from fault conditions. The
increasing demand for robust products, composed of complex
sub-systems that must maintain the longest possible opera-
tional life-span, has brought self-repairing capability firmly
into the design and manufacturing fray. At the same time,
electronic sub-systems have become particularly vulnerable to
environmentally-induced random and cumulative fault condi-
tions and thus a significant body of literature has appeared
that seeks to exploit the unique flexibility available within
electronics for fault mitigation. As such, the authors have
observed a number of recent trends paving the way towards
zero-maintenance designs for electronics with the common
goal of regaining: robust, error-resilient operation with major
impacts expected in product availability and cost of mainte-
nance. From fault detection and classification to passive and
active fault mitigation, integrated self-recovery is becoming
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TABLE XVI
DETAILED HIERARCHY FOR ZERO-MAINTENANCE STRATEGIES
Method Benefits Challenges
Status reporting
Logging key metrics (remaining capacity,
faults classification etc.) to assist
maintenance planning
Fault signals must traverse multiple design
levels; effective filtering and interpreting of
signals at application layer
Self-maintenance
Correction faults in-service (and online
where possible) using a variety of actions
to prolong operational window
Will most likely require several strategies
across multiple integrated levels: masking,
detection/reporting and active reallocation
Built-in self-test and
repair (BISTAR)
Combined detection and restoration on chip
Requires detect and active logic for
reallocation of resources. Difficult to
validate all possible states
Built-in
reconfiguration
Capability to restore correct operation in
the event of fault
Relies upon a reconfigurable chip. Usually
requires external initiation
Supervised repair
(production yield
enhancement)
Highly efficient reallocation of resources
for reduced failure rate
Requires complex production tester and
precisely controlled environment
Built-in self-test
(BIT)
Relatively simple logic overhead; detection
of errors at specific intervals
Often limited to detecting persistent faults
power on time
Self-preservation /
fault avoidance
Put measures in place to reduce impact of
further faults
Requires accurate monitoring, possibly
anticipation of impending fault events
Fault masking Fixed structure; validation is relatively easy
Of limited fault capacity, can become
potentially high resource overhead for
fine-grained strategies
Fault
event
Centralised or localised control
Available resources
Detect
Conrm
coverage
Report
status
Calculate
fault
capacity
Confirm/report
Execute
response
Transient fault
has occurred
Response
Data EDC
Mask fault
Permanent error
has occurred
A parameter value
has deviated
Fig. 5. Depiction of a possible top-level design of zero-maintenance systems with various options. Several implementations are possible: the example shown
here includes masking and active response for permanent error or analogue parameter. Collection of status including evaluation of available resources are also
shown.
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TABLE XVII
APPLICATION EXAMPLES LINKED TO ZERO-MAINTENANCE FOR HIGH-VALUE SECTORS
Application Faults Status Opportunities for zero-maintenance
A
v
ia
ti
o
n Civil and military
aircraft; autonomous
flight
Radiation effects from
ground to 60,000ft
nMR; mutual-checking/voting systems;
resilient sensors for test beds [146]
Predictable recovery; assistive fault
monitoring and discrimination
E
n
er
g
y
Wind turbine and
nuclear
decommissioning;
inspection; disaster
assessment
Heavy radiation; remote
servicing/inspection;
detection & monitoring for
harsh environments
Fault-detection and diagnosis [147];
robotic inspection [148];
Self-maintaining control systems;
sustained operation; functional
hardening [149]
S
p
a
ce
Exploration and orbital
communications
systems
SEU/MBU mitigation
Modularized electronics, interconnect
[150]; resilient SoC [151],
transceivers [152] & redundancy [66], for
spacecraft altitude [153]
Unmanned systems that self-maintain
(e.g. Skylon); modular spares;
sophisticated fault diagnosis [131]
V
eh
ic
le
s Dependability of
safety-critical
subsystems
Vibration; temperature
cycling; ground level SEU
Reconfigurable MCM platforms; Secure
Soc; electromechanical redundancy, for
electric ship power systems [154]
The self-healing vehicle [155];
mitigation for systemic failures;
fail-save; rapid recovery
R
a
il
On-board power and
control systems;
electrification
Ageing; fault prevention
and discrimination
Power-on self-test routines for power
systems. Guided repair [156]
Enhanced fault logging & localization;
maintaining predictable operation
M
in
in
g Autonomous
exploration; pipeline
inspection
Extreme environment
(drilling, mining, deep sea)
Autonomous vehicles; extreme
environment sensing and predictive failure
monitoring [157]
Prolonged unmanned operation with
limited communications; fault logging
collaborative systems
adopted within the electrical and electronic discipline; coupled
systems with significant benefits to be seen across transport,
health care, mining/exploration, nuclear energy and space
exploration engineering systems. The aim was to set out the
potential impacts with regard to intermittent fault scenarios and
the overall maintenance cost overheads, that plague modern
complex systems. This is principally due to the fact that:
• Electronics support the necessary flexibility for provision
of resources and built-in intelligence;
• Upset mechanisms are projected to become more preva-
lent within next-generation nanoscale design;
• Aggressive scaling of COTS devices towards the neces-
sary complexity, especially with regard to online detec-
tion and resource allocation.
In the light of the above mentioned, the authors had noted
significant recent research activity reported in future nanoscale
analogue and digital design, contemporary CMOS, current
and future configurable integrated circuits, electromechanical
sub-systems and assemblies, complex mechatronic and cyber
physical systems. As a consequence, this paper considered the
current and future technology trends that will make possible a
zero-maintenance design; that is based on masking and active
mitigation techniques driven by emerging nano- and printable-
electronics technologies. This includes built-in fault detection
and logging, fine-grained redundancy (with new possibilities
for masking), self-reconfiguration and self-reallocation. An
alternative perspective is that zero-maintenance is composed of
methods for self-monitoring and self-management of internal
redundant resources. It is also clear that, rather than being
outdated, passive masking strategies have an important role to
play in some environments though they become ineffectual as
ageing-related faults begin to manifest.
A. Future opportunities
Several opportunities exist for fundamental advancement in
this area: novel detection mechanisms need to be identified to
underpin masking and reconfiguration strategies; The handling
of interconnect-related failures is sorely neglected [8] and
needs further research work to understand its impact upon de-
sign for zero-maintenance. Finally, Combining multiple fine-
grained sensing and repair strategies for both manufacturing
yield and through-life maintenance will lead to more efficient
resource reuse. The associated design challenges are equally
significant: i) justifying cost of resources and design com-
plexity (including test and evaluation); ii) gaining confidence
in new strategies; iii) overcoming barriers for certification in
certain application areas; iv) understanding the options for
integrating zero-maintenance at various design levels (and
potentially cross-layered approaches). In most instances, there
is a lack of EDA tool support for effective design exploration
and evaluation. From the multitude of strategies considered,
it seems clear that no single approach to zero-maintenance in
electronics will win and that a multi-objective design approach
is necessary
Design for zero-maintenance incurs many competing design
goals across several areas in electronics sub-systems. These
systems are composed of many sub-systems that must operate
error-free otherwise downtime leads to a direct loss of service
high MRO costs. At the chip-level, speed, efficiency and
cost per unit area are paramount though test and verification
complexity are becoming limiting factors. Board-level and
higher levels bring in new factors including weight, absolute
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cost, integration density and accessibility for inspection. At
the top design level, inter-modular issues are prevalent in-
cluding cabling and connectors, density issues (e.g., thermal
management) and efficiency of space usage (e.g., in compact
avionics bay). Once again, the test and verification complexity
is ever-increasing. Traditional approaches such as design for
reliability, component screening and modular redundancy have
been enlisted with mission critical systems but their cost is
often viewed as being unjustifiable. New low-level capabilities
promise to bring underlying fault detection and discrimination
but these capabilities must be integrated.
Where possible, zero-maintenance techniques should be
tightly integrated with maintenance-related technologies. This
is possible owing to the already mature hierarchical archi-
tecture of microelectronics design, though perhaps less well-
developed at the higher board, sub-module levels. The poten-
tial impact brought about by zero-maintenance should not be
underestimated, especially for industrial applications that are
heavily penalised by downtime. At the same time, autonomous
maintenance strategies may lead to difficulties in certification.
For example, if the trustworthiness of a sub-component is
dependent on knowing its exact configuration at any time,
then self-configuring approaches may be challenging, and fault
masking may be the only route. Information arising from fault
registration, discrimination and localisation will provide new
opportunities for assessing system status in terms of fault
capacity, environmental harshness and onset of ageing. This
could potentially revolutionise predictive and scheduled main-
tenance as well as better-informing major MRO and major
failure events as well as offering self-preservation capabilities
when faults can be predicted. Fault localisation offers direct
benefits for fault tracing in complex systems and to avoid
no-fault found scenarios. However, it is less obvious how
zero-maintenance strategies will directly solve this particular
problem and they may instead reside alongside bespoke fault
locating strategies.
Active mitigation methods are undoubtedly closest to the
vision of self-healing systems, but are still reliant upon effec-
tive (re-)organisation of their internal resources. In this con-
text, self-healing may not become autonomic (i.e., fully self-
initiated) due to the need for fault registration and reporting of
events where resources have been re-organised, re-generated
or drawn down from external sources [22]. An example of a
process that is part self-healing is seen in [158], in which
a data storage device contains embedded heating elements
able to restore neighbouring non-responsive storage cells. This
has the effect of re-establishing the correct material response
and so the recovery of degraded memory cells is accelerated.
The precise relationships between self-maintenance and self-
healing technologies have yet not been established.
It could be argued that a better balance must be achieved
between preventing faults from ever occurring in the first place
and mitigation, e.g., super conducting quantum locked fields
for space travel that may provide both simultaneous propul-
sion and strong shielding against radiation particles for both
passengers and electronic systems. Such developments could
help readdress the balance between fault prevention/mitigation
coupled hardware/software design. In the event of disruptive
future technologies, one might still ask what would be the
consequences of failures of the clever idea itself i.e., in
the above example resulting in loss of shielding? This still
validates the wider arguments in this article even if there
were a paradigm shift in hardware/software capabilities.
Despite recent advancements, the building blocks of design
for zero-maintenance need to be better understood. The tra-
ditional paradigm of multi-level design is well-suited, but a
holistic approach is needed to combine strategies potentially
across multiple design levels. An evolution from tolerance
towards active mitigation has been observed in electronics,
due in part to projected capabilities of (and manufactur-
ing challenges associated with) nanoscale electronics. How-
ever, although emerging strategies promise much for zero-
maintenance capabilities within future electronic systems, their
success is dependent upon a more precise and predictable
evaluation of the associated resource overhead, performance
impact and fault capacity metrics. The future of this field looks
promising and equally pervasive to a host of applications and
domains. We ourselves are looking towards development of
practical demonstrations of whole systems that exhibit this
philosophy of zero-maintenance, beyond just electronics but
also mechanical and robotic systems, particularly within the
manufacturing and through-life services industries, where we
will likewise also outline our perspectives, challenges and
opportunities.
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